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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has always relied in part on surveillance prac-
tices to obtain information about foreign governments, international 
and domestic organizations, and citizens of the United States.  The 
twentieth century exemplifies this behavior.  In 1918, the Overman 
Committee was established to investigate pro-German sentiments, 
and later investigated the influence of Communist Bolsheviks in the 
United States.1  In 1930, the Fish Committee was established to inves-
tigate people and organizations suspected of being involved with or 
supporting Communist activities in the United States.2  From 1934–
1937, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities Authorized 
to Investigate Nazi Propaganda and Certain Other Propaganda Activ-
ities, also known as the McCormack-Dickstein Committee, was 
formed to investigate how Nazi propaganda came into the United 
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States, and to investigate the organizations spreading it.3  During 
World War II, the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
(“HUAC”) was established as a special investigating committee of the 
House of Representatives.4  HUAC succeeded the Fish Committee 
and the McCormack-Dickstein Committee, and was developed to in-
vestigate alleged disloyalty and subversive actions by private citizens, 
public employees, and those organizations suspected of having 
Communist ties.5  HUAC became a permanent committee in 1945,6 
but it slowly lost favor until it was denounced by President Harry 
Truman in 1959 as the “most un-American thing in the country to-
day.”7 
However, surveillance by the United States became hotly con-
tested again in the 1970s, due to the widespread disapproval of the 
Vietnam War and the unfolding of the Watergate scandal.  The Unit-
ed States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-
tions with Respect to Intelligence Activities, more commonly known 
as the Church Committee, investigated intelligence-gathering me-
thods by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for illegality.  New laws, such as the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, regarding proper surveillance procedures were de-
veloped as a result of these investigations. 
Due to the globalization of computer usage and the Internet, the 
effectiveness and applicability of these laws may be diminishing.  Ter-
rorists have become quite sophisticated in carrying out their terror-
ism plans, and it seems like the rest of the world is always reacting de-
fensively to the newest terrorism means.  However, the non-terrorists 
could be on the offensive by exploring a possible new medium that 
can be used by terrorist organizations—virtual worlds. 
Although there has been no public proof to date of terrorists de-
vising plots in virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft,8 Second Life,9 
 
 3 Sam Tanenhaus, Investigating Un-American Activities, Now and Then, N.Y. TIMES:  ARTS BEAT 
(Mar. 9, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/investigating-
un-american-activities-now-and-then/. 
 4 HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee), HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/
topics/house-un-american-activities-committee (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 5 Id. 
 6 See ROBERT K. CARR, THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 1945–1950, at 
19 (1952) (describing HUAC as “one of the most remarkable procedural coups in mod-
ern Congressional history”). 
 7 STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, THE CULTURE OF THE COLD WAR 124 (1996) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 8 WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://us.battle.net/wow/en/ (last visited May 9, 2011). 
 9 SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited May 9, 2011). 
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and others, some members of Congress10 and some terrorism ex-
perts11 fear that this is next on the agenda for terrorist organizations.  
Terrorists can be rehearsing attacks in these virtual worlds, just like 
the United States military trains with commercial “shoot-em-up 
games.”12  Virtual world massive multiplayer games make it easy to 
contact and assemble plotters from around the world.  Virtual worlds 
are hard to monitor because a user account name is a pseudonym for 
the individual user, the access is global, and the language used may 
be hard to decode.  Therefore, using virtual worlds to carry out ter-
rorist activities, recruit, communicate, and launder money may re-
quire the United States either to use existing law or create new legis-
lation that permits the federal government or Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) to monitor this type of conduct in the virtual 
world. 
This Article is divided into three Parts:  I.  Surveillance before the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) in the United 
States;13 II.  Surveillance post-9/11; and III.  Surveillance in the virtual 
world.  Specifically, Part I will provide a general discussion about 
United States surveillance law before 9/11.  Part II will discuss how 
surveillance law changed due to 9/11.  Finally, Part III will focus on 
the applicability of the United States’ surveillance laws to virtual 
worlds and how to protect the United States from the possible use of 
virtual worlds to engage in terrorist activity. 
I.  SURVEILLANCE BEFORE 9/11 
Citizens of the United States have always been entitled to protec-
tion from intrusions by the federal government into their private 
conversations and communications.  The Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and statutory provisions such as Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“Wiretap Act”), the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), and the Communica-
 
 10 See Sharon Weinberger, Congress Freaks Out Over Second Life Terrorism, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2008, 
12:44 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/04/second-life/ (“One of the 
concerns, brought up by some members of Congress, was that Second Life could be used 
[to] launder terrorist funds.”). 
 11 Natalie O’Brien, Spies Watch Rise of Virtual Terrorists, AUSTRALIAN (July 31, 2007, 12:00 
AM), http://www.news.com.au/top-stories/spies-watch-rise-of-virtual-terrorists/story-
e6frfkp9-1111114075761 (“[T]errorism experts are warning that [Second Life] attacks 
have ramifications for the real world.”). 
 12 Noah Shachtman, Pentagon Researcher Conjures Warcraft Terror Plot, WIRED (Sept. 15, 2008, 
5:22 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/09/world-of-warcra/. 
 13 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 
(2004). 
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tions Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”) have protected 
this right.  However, each of these laws has loopholes that can be 
used to circumvent ordinary privacy expectations.  Additionally, Na-
tional Security Letters can also be used to obtain records of transac-
tional data, further circumventing privacy expectations.  This Part will 
address the enactment and application of each of these laws prior to 
9/11. 
A.   Fourth Amendment Protection 
One way the federal government is prohibited from monitoring 
its citizens’ communications is through the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.  The Fourth Amendment states, “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi-
olated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”14  
An individual’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated when the 
federal government’s conduct amounts to a “search.” 
In the United States Supreme Court case, Katz v. United States, Jus-
tice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, established a two-prong test to 
determine when government action constitutes a search.15  First, does 
the individual have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy?  
Second, does society recognize that this expectation is (objectively) 
reasonable?16  The standard to evaluate whether a search is reasona-
ble requires assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it in-
trudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed to advance a legitimate governmental interest. 
When an individual is in public, such as driving, talking outside to 
a friend, or shopping at a mall, there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Because anyone can observe his or her behavior, an individ-
ual does not have an actual expectation of privacy regarding conduct 
in public.  Furthermore, there is no objective expectation of privacy 
in these scenarios because it would be unreasonable for society to 
think that actions in public are private actions entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.  In contrast, conduct in one’s home is con-
sidered private because a home is one’s personal space, and the 
home is considered sacrosanct.  However, if individuals present out-
side of one’s private home can hear a conversation occurring inside 
the home, or can smell an odor coming from the home, there is no 
 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 15 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 16 Id. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of that conversation 
or odor.17  Only activity contained within the home is covered by an 
increased expectation of privacy.  Once the activity can be observed 
or noticed outside the home, it loses this higher form of protection.  
Under most circumstances, conduct inside an individual’s home is 
expected to be protected from government intrusion; society would 
find this expectation reasonable because a government’s interest in 
intruding into the sanctity of one’s home is generally outweighed by 
an individual’s privacy interest.18 
Generally, a search is considered unreasonable unless there is a 
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate supported by probable cause.  
However, there are some exceptions to the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement for a search.  The ones relevant here are consent to 
be searched,19 exigent circumstances,20 and whether evidence is lo-
cated in plain view.21  First, the consent exception applies when an 
individual voluntarily agrees to be monitored under certain circums-
tances.  This voluntary agreement eliminates any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in such conduct.  Second, exigent circumstances exist 
when there is an emergency situation requiring swift action to pre-
vent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, to fores-
tall the imminent escape of a suspect, or to thwart the destruction of 
evidence.  There is no standard test for determining whether such 
circumstances exist, and in each case the extraordinary situation must 
be measured by the facts known by officials.22  However, those cir-
cumstances must “cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or 
other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm 
to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, 
the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly 
frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.”23  Exigency may be 
 
 17 Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, EFF SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE PROJECT, https://ssd.eff. 
org/your-computer/govt/privacy (last visited May 9, 2011). 
 18 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] man’s home is, for most purposes, 
a place where he expects privacy . . . .”). 
 19 J. SCOTT HARR & KÄREN M. HESS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 219 (3d ed. 2005). 
 20 United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining that a warrantless 
search conducted by police officers is constitutional when there are exigent circums-
tances, and any seizure of evidence as a result is permissible). 
 21 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (determining that a warrantless seizure of 
evidence in plain sight is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment). 
 22 People v. Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Cal. 1976) (discussing whether exigent circums-
tances exist is based upon an evaluation of the facts as they are known to an officer). 
 23 United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 
(1984). 
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determined by a variety of factors, such as the degree of urgency in-
volved, the amount of time needed to get a warrant, whether evi-
dence is about to be removed or destroyed, and/or ready destructibil-
ity of the evidence.24  Third, the plain view doctrine is applicable 
when three factors are satisfied:  a) the officer is lawfully present at 
the place where the evidence can be plainly viewed; b) the officer has 
a lawful right of access to the object; and c) the incriminating charac-
ter of the object is “immediately apparent.”25  If any of these excep-
tions apply, then there is no reasonable expectation of privacy;26 
therefore, the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are 
not implicated. 
B. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
Another mechanism prohibiting the federal government from 
monitoring its citizens’ communications is Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968.27  Title III is better known 
as the Wiretap Act.28  Briefly, the Wiretap Act addresses the issuance 
of domestic criminal surveillance warrants.  Specifically, the Wiretap 
Act:  “[1] prohibits the unauthorized, nonconsensual interception of 
‘wire, oral, or electronic communications’29 by government agencies 
as well as private parties[; 2] establishes procedures for obtaining 
warrants to authorize wiretapping by government officials[;] and [3] 
regulates the disclosure and use of authorized intercepted communi-
cations by investigative and law enforcement officers.”30 
The procedures established in order to obtain a warrant authoriz-
ing wiretapping by a government official are similar to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement.  The Wiretap Act permits a judge 
to issue a warrant authorizing interception of communications for up 
to thirty days upon a showing of probable cause that the interception 
 
 24 United States v. Reed, 935 F.2d 641, 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 960 (1991) (dis-
cussing various factors to consider when determining if exigent circumstances exist). 
 25 Horton, 496 U.S. at 136–37 (internal quotation marks omitted) (outlining the elements of 
the plain view doctrine in order to establish the constitutionality of a warrantless search 
under these circumstances). 
 26 Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, supra note 17. 
 27 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006). 
 28 The Nature and Scope of Governmental Electronic Surveillance Activity, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY 
& TECH. (July 2006), http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/wiretap_overview.html. 
 29 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006).  The term “electronic communications” was added by 
Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986.  See Privacy & Civil Liberties, 
JUST. INFO. SHARING, http://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1284 (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2012). 
 30 Privacy & Civil Liberties, supra note 29. 
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will reveal evidence that “an individual is committing, has committed, 
or is about to commit a particular offense” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2516.31 
However, the Wiretap Act’s warrant requirement can be overcome 
by a variety of exceptions.  First, like the exigent circumstances excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Wiretap 
Act’s warrant requirement can be overcome by 
any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the 
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney 
General, or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivi-
sion thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who reasonably de-
termines that . . . an emergency situation exists that in-
volves . . . immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any 
person, [or there are] conspiratorial activities threatening the national 
security interest . . . that require[] a wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion to be intercepted before an order authorizing such interception can, 
with due diligence, be obtained . . . .32 
Basically, this exception applies when it has been reasonably deter-
mined that an emergency situation exists that requires information to 
be intercepted without delay.  An emergency situation is one that 
could result in immediate death or serious physical injury to any per-
son, or that involves a conspiracy that threatens the national security 
interest of the United States. 
Second, like the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement, the Wiretap Act also has a consent exception.  
This exception states that “[i]t shall not be unlawful . . . for a person 
acting under color of law to intercept a[n] . . . electronic communi-
cation, where such person is a party to the communication or one of 
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such in-
terception.”33  In regards to this exception, a “person” is defined to 
include an “agent of the United States . . . , any individual, partner-
ship, association, . . . or corporation[.]”34 
Third, the Wiretap Act has an ISP exception.  This exception 
makes the warrant requirement of the Wiretap Act inapplicable in 
regards to the “intercept[ion], disclos[ure], or use” of an “electronic 
communication” by a “provider of [a] wire or electronic communica-
tion service . . . engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident 
to . . . the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that 
service . . . .”35  Basically, this exception gives a service provider the 
 
 31 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a). 
 32 Id. § 2518(7). 
 33 Id. § 2511(2)(c). 
 34 Id. § 2510(6). 
 35 Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i). 
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right “to intercept and monitor [communications] placed over their 
facilities in order to combat fraud and theft of service.”36  With that 
said, this exception does not allow service providers to engage in un-
limited screening.37  However, a service provider and its agents can 
engage in reasonable screening, which means that a balance is 
reached between the service provider’s interests to safeguard its 
rights and property, and its users’ right to privacy in their electronic 
communications.38 
C.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
FISA governs the process for electronic surveillance of foreign in-
telligence information within the United States.39  Under FISA, a war-
rant is required to obtain information through electronic surveil-
lance.  FISA provides four distinct definitions of what constitutes 
“electronic surveillance.”40  These definitions are as follows: 
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance 
device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or in-
tended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is 
in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally target-
ing that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for 
law enforcement purposes; 
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance 
device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in 
the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acqui-
sition occurs in the United States, but does not include the acquisition of 
those communications of computer trespassers that would be permissible 
under section 2511(2)(i) of Title 18; 
. . . . 
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveil-
lance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, 
other than from a wire . . . communication, under circumstances in 
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant 
would be required for law enforcement purposes.41 
 
 36 United States v. Villanueva, 32 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 37 See United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 1976) (“This authority of the tele-
phone company to intercept and disclose wire communications is not unlimited.”). 
 38 See United States v. Harvey, 540 F.2d 1345, 1351 (8th Cir. 1976) (“The federal 
courts . . . have construed the statute to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the in-
vestigating communication carrier.”). 
 39 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006). 
 40 Id. § 1801(f)(1)–(4). 
 41 Id. § 1801(f)(1)–(2), (4). 
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In other words, the government is required to obtain a warrant to 
engage in electronic surveillance when it is intentionally targeting a 
United States citizen who has a reasonable expectation of privacy; it 
acquires communication without the consent of any party; or it ob-
tains information from something other than a wire communication 
when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The procedure to get a warrant under FISA requires the Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) to apply to the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court (“FISC”) to receive a court order authorizing surveillance 
of foreign agents.42  The federal agent applying for a court order only 
needs to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the “target of the 
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power,”43 that “a significant purpose” of the surveillance is “to obtain 
foreign intelligence information,” and that appropriate “minimiza-
tion procedures” are in place.44  The minimization requirement is 
implemented to minimize the collection, retention, and dissemina-
tion of information.45  The agent does not need to demonstrate that 
the commission of a crime is imminent.46  However, there is an addi-
tional requirement if the target includes United States persons, which 
are defined as United States citizens, permanent resident aliens, and 
United States corporations.  This additional requirement that must 
be proven by the federal agent is that “the target knowingly engages 
in sabotage or international terrorism or is preparing for such activi-
ties.”47 
The FISA warrant requirement is also subject to a few exceptions.  
The only relevant exception here gives the President authority to en-
gage in electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence infor-
mation without a FISC order when the Attorney General certifies that 
there is “no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire 
the contents of any communication to which a United States person 
 
 42 Id. § 1805. 
 43 Id. § 1804(a)(4)(A).  For purposes of FISA, agents of foreign powers include agents of 
foreign political organizations and groups engaged in international terrorism, as well as 
agents of foreign nations.  Id. § 1801(b). 
 44 Id. § 1804(a)(5), (7)(B). 
 45 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic. 
org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (explaining that “[m]inimization 
procedures are designed to prevent the broad power of foreign intelligence gathering 
from being used for routine criminal investigations” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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is a party,” provided the surveillance is directed solely at communica-
tions among or between foreign powers.48 
D.  Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
CALEA was enacted by Congress in 1994 because of law enforce-
ment’s concern that the increased use of digital telephone exchange 
switches would make tapping phone lines harder or impossible.49  
Basically, CALEA requires telephone companies to design their net-
works in a way that makes it easier for the federal government to 
conduct criminal investigations using wiretapping of telephone net-
works.50  The purpose of CALEA is to enhance the ability of law en-
forcement and intelligence agencies to conduct electronic surveil-
lance by requiring that telecommunications carriers 
and manufacturers of telecommunications equipment modify and 
design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they 
have built-in surveillance capabilities, which allow federal agencies to 
monitor all telephone traffic under certain circumstances.51 
E. National Security Letters 
A National Security Letter (“NSL”) is a type of administrative sub-
poena that is used by federal agencies to obtain various records and 
data pertaining to an individual from a particular entity or organiza-
tion.52  NSLs can only request non-content information, such as 
transactional records, phone numbers dialed, or e-mail addresses in 
the “to” or “from” field.53  An NSL does not have to be supported by 
probable cause or have judicial oversight.54 
National Security Letters were first used in 1986 to circumvent the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act55 in counterintelligence cases and were 
limited to foreign powers or persons who the FBI had reasonable 
 
 48 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(B). 
 49 CALEA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/issues/calea (last visited May 
9, 2011). 
 50 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006). 
 51 Id. 
 52 National Security Letters, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/nsl/
#overview (last visited May 9, 2011). 
 53 Overview:  What Does an NSL Do?, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/
privacy/nsl/#overview (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 54 Legal Authority for NSL Power, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/
nsl/#authority (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 55 Id. 
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cause to believe were agents of a foreign power.56  Compliance with 
this NSL was voluntary, and state consumer privacy laws usually per-
mitted institutions to decline these requests.57  This remedy never 
identified any penalties for failing to comply with an NSL request.58  
In 1993, restrictions regarding obtaining information from a “foreign 
power” were relaxed, and the use of NSLs was expanded to include 
any person suspected of communicating with foreign agents regard-
ing espionage or terrorism.59 
NSLs are different from traditional subpoenas or warrants.  First, 
they contain a non-disclosure provision.  An entity that receives an 
NSL is prohibited from disclosing to anyone that they received an 
NSL or the contents of the NSL.60  Second, they do not require judi-
cial oversight—the judicial branch is not required to approve the is-
suance of an NSL.61  This has led to some problems in implementa-
tion, as described later.62 
II.  SURVEILLANCE AFTER 9/11 
The events that occurred on September 11, 2001 have greatly im-
pacted the law enforcement landscape of the United States.  Since 
9/11, the United States has been more aggressively developing poli-
cies and using tactics to protect United States citizens from terrorist 
attacks and punish those responsible for them.  These policies ad-
dress actual attacks on United States soil or overseas against United 
States citizens, the aiding and abetting of terrorist activities, and the 
planning of terrorist activities.  Many rights and laws that existed 
prior to 9/11, such as the Fourth Amendment protection against un-
reasonable searches, the Wiretap Act, FISA, CALEA, and the use of 
National Security Letters have been adapted or reinterpreted since 
9/11 to accommodate these new policies and tactics. 
 
 56 Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1. 
 57 Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3405 (2006). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Basic Look at National Security Letters, USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.usatoday. 
com/news/washington/2007-03-09-1844717959_x.htm. 
 60 National Security Letters, supra note 52.  Following enactment of the PATRIOT Reauthori-
zation Act of 2005, however, entities receiving NSLs may disclose if doing so to seek legal 
advice or otherwise comply with the NSL.  Id.  Various cases, such as Doe v. Holder, 640 F. 
Supp. 2d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), and Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008), have chal-
lenged the non-disclosure requirement as unconstitutional, which has resulted in limita-
tions being placed on the non-disclosure requirement. 
 61 National Security Letters, supra note 52. 
 62 See infra p. 1049. 
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A.  Fourth Amendment Protection 
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution has not been altered, the interpretation of what consti-
tutes a reasonable search and when an exception to the warrant re-
quirement is applicable has been interpreted more broadly since 
9/11.  For example, during the Bush Administration, President 
George W. Bush authorized the warrantless eavesdropping on Ameri-
cans and others inside the United States to find evidence of terrorist 
activity.63  This program included the monitoring of international tel-
ephone calls and international e-mail messages.64  The Bush adminis-
tration viewed this behavior as necessary so the federal government 
could move quickly to monitor communications that may disclose 
threats to the United States.65  Victims of this warrantless surveillance 
have attempted to seek redress in federal courts.  While most cases 
have been dismissed, some cases, such as the case that was formerly 
known as Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush,66 have been de-
cided against the United States.67  However, this pro-plaintiff outcome 
is unusual, and Al-Haramain may have turned out differently if it had 
been heard in a federal court that tends to favor the government on 
national security matters.68 
Although it is hard to prove that the Fourth Amendment has been 
interpreted differently since 9/11, Jameel Jaffer, an attorney with the 
American Civil Liberties Union, acknowledges that “[i]f you take a 
broad look at the big Fourth Amendment cases that have been de-
cided since 9/11 . . . it’s pretty clear that, in applying the ‘reasona-
 
 63 Bush Administration’s Warrantless Wiretapping Program, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/15/AR2007051500
999.html. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 67 Kevin Bankston, Court Rejects Government’s Executive Power Claims and Rules That Warrantless 
Wiretapping Violated Law, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2010), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/court-rules-warrantless-wiretapping-illegal (last 
visited July 24, 2011); Burke Hansen, Bush-Authored Warrantless Wiretapping Suffers Abrupt 
Defeat, REGISTER, Apr. 2, 2010, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/04/02/warantless_
wiretapping_defeat/. 
 68 Hansen, supra note 67; David Kravets, Feds Appeal Warrantless-Wiretapping Defeat, WIRED:  
THREAT LEVEL (Feb. 22, 2011, 4:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/
02/feds-appealing-wiretap-defeat/ (acknowledging the oddity of the San Francisco feder-
al judge ruling against the federal government in a national security case). 
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bleness’ test, the courts have been more deferential to the executive 
since 9/11 than they were before 9/11.”69 
B.  Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
The Wiretap Act was modified after 9/11 by the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“PATRIOT”), the 
PATRIOT Reauthorization Acts in 2006, and the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008.  Most significantly, the PATRIOT Act of 2001 added ter-
rorist and computer crimes to the Wiretap Act’s predicated offense 
list.70 
C.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
FISA was also modified after 9/11 by the PATRIOT Act of 2001, 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and 
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.  The PATRIOT Act made a varie-
ty of changes to FISA.  First, it eased the restrictions on foreign intel-
ligence gathering within the United States.  The PATRIOT Act did 
this by permitting “roving” surveillance, which allows the interception 
of any communications made to or by an intelligence target without 
specifying the particular telephone line, computer, or other facility to 
be monitored.71  The probable cause standard now requires only that 
a significant purpose of surveillance be the gathering of foreign intel-
ligence information, instead of it being the sole or primary purpose.72  
Second, the United States intelligence community was given greater 
access to information discovered during a criminal investigation, 
which meant that “the wall” between criminal investigation and intel-
ligence gathering was eliminated.73  Lastly, the PATRIOT Act prohi-
bits a cause of action in any court against a provider of a wire or elec-
tronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or any other 
person that furnishes any information, facilities, or technical assis-
tance in accordance with a court order or request for emergency as-
sistance under such Act.74 
 
 69 E-mail from Jameel Jaffer, Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to author (Apr. 6, 2011, 
5:48 PM) (on file with author). 
 70 PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 814, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 382 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)). 
 71 Id. tit. 2, § 206. 
 72 Id. § 218. 
 73 Id. § 203(a), (c). 
 74 Id. § 225. 
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The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
amended the definition of a “foreign power or agent of a foreign 
power” by adding the “Lone Wolf” Amendment.75  Under FISA, the 
“Lone Wolf” Amendment makes a non-United States person who en-
gages in international terrorism or activities in preparation for inter-
national terrorism an “agent of a foreign power” regardless of that 
individual’s actual status.76  This Amendment was added to FISA in re-
sponse to the FBI’s failure to prosecute Zacarias Moussaoui.77  The 
FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service in Minneapolis de-
tained Moussaoui on August 16, 2001 for a visa waiver violation.78  Al-
though the FBI soon discovered that Moussaoui held jihadist beliefs 
and was suspected of being an Islamic extremist, the FBI failed to get 
a court order under FISA from the FISC authorizing surveillance be-
cause the FBI believed that FISA standards could not be met since the 
FBI could not find any evidence that Moussaoui was an agent of a 
foreign power.79  However, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks, there was speculation that Moussaoui was the missing twentieth 
hijacker, and the failure on the part of law enforcement and the in-
telligence side to fully investigate Moussaoui when he was in FBI cus-
tody prior to the 9/11 attacks became a huge point of criticism.80  The 
United States wanted to ensure that a “lone wolf” would not slip 
through the cracks again. 
The FISA Amendments of 2008 also made a variety of alterations 
to FISA.  They allow eavesdropping in emergencies without court ap-
proval, provided the government files required papers within a week, 
and they expand the range of persons being targeted by warrantless 
electronic surveillance.81  Specifically, the Amendments permit the 
FISC to have jurisdiction over a United States person reasonably be-
lieved to be located outside the United States in order to acquire for-
eign intelligence information.82  Finally, the Amendments provide 
immunity for any electronic communication service provider that 
 
 75 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6001, 
118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (2004). 
 76 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2006). 
 77 See Patricia L. Bellia, The “Lone Wolf” Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 425, 426 (2005) (stating that the “Moussaoui episode” prompt-
ed the FISA amendment). 
 78 Id. at 425. 
 79 Id. at 425–26. 
 80 Id. at 426. 
 81 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121391360949290049.html. 
 82 Id. 
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provides information, facilities, or assistance to the Attorney General 
and the Director of National Intelligence,83 in addition to their pre-
vious immunities. 
D.  Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
CALEA has been modified post-9/11 as well.  The biggest change 
occurred in 2004 when CALEA mandates were extended to the In-
ternet.84  The DOJ, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (“ATF”), the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (“DEA”) filed a joint petition with the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) to expand their powers to include the ability to 
monitor Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (“VoIP”) and broadband Inter-
net communications in order to monitor Web traffic as well as phone 
calls.85  The FCC adopted these requests in a “First Report and Or-
der,” which was reaffirmed in 2006 in a “Second Report and Order.”86 
Furthermore, the role of CALEA has significantly increased.  
From 2004 to 2007, there was a 62% growth in the number of wire-
taps performed under CALEA and more than a 3000% growth in the 
interception of digital files, such as e-mail.87 
E.  National Security Letters 
As a result of 9/11 and the Bush Administration, the PATRIOT 
Act significantly expanded the use of NSLs.  For example, the num-
ber of NSLs that are issued each year has increased.  Now, the FBI is-
sues more than 30,000 NSLs a year.88  Additionally, NSLs are now 
used to scrutinize United States citizens, residents, or visitors who are 
not suspected to be part of any criminal investigation.89 
NSLs do have their limitations.  For example, they cannot be uti-
lized as a way to eavesdrop or read the contents of e-mail.  However, 
since 9/11 NSLs have allowed investigators to “obtain sensitive in-
formation such as the web sites a person visits, a list of e-mail ad-
dresses with which a person has corresponded, or even unmask the 
 
 83 Id. 
 84  CALEA FAQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
pages/calea-faq. 
 85 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), FED. COMMS. COMMISSION 
(Feb. 21, 2007), http://www.fcc.gov/calea/. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Ryan Singel, Point, Click . . . Eavesdrop:  How the FBI Wiretap Net Operates, WIRED (Aug. 29, 
2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/08/wiretap?currentPage=3. 
 88 Gellman, supra note 56. 
 89 Id. 
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identity of a person who has posted anonymous speech on a political 
website.”90 
III. SURVEILLANCE IN THE VIRTUAL WORLD 
The virtual world is a three-dimensional computer-generated por-
trayal of the real world but existing only in cyberspace.91  Virtual 
worlds are set up just like the real world—“users will find the sun, 
wind, buildings, paved streets, grass, rivers, seas, mountains, islands, 
and countries, all recreated to look and ‘feel’ as if users were actually 
living in cyber reality.”92 
Originally, virtual worlds were just massive multiplayer online role-
playing games, or MMORPGs,93 where a user creates a character to 
represent himself, which is known as an “avatar.”94  An avatar does not 
have to be an exact replication of a user, and a user’s avatar can take 
on different and new roles in the virtual world.95 
However, as time has passed, virtual worlds have become more 
than just a game.96  As in the real world, users can go to work, con-
duct business, attend virtual churches, and join virtual societies.97  Vir-
tual worlds have become so popular that about 20 to 30 million users 
actually “spend” more time in virtual worlds than they do in the real 
world.98  These worlds are becoming more than a world of make-
believe.  “[R]eal-life corporations, universities, government agencies, 
and medical centers are venturing into virtual worlds to hold classes, 
conduct research, and provide training.”99  Now, virtual worlds are 
even being used to train soldiers.100 
 
 90 National Security Letters, ACLU (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/national-security-
technology-and-liberty/national-security-letters. 
 91 See THE STATE OF PLAY:  LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 3 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Si-
mone Noveck eds., 2006). 
 92 Bettina M. Chin, Regulating Your Second Life:  Defamation in Virtual Worlds, 72 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1303, 1303 (2007).  “[Second Life] is ostensibly a free-range graphical environment 
where users may explore, interact, create, and trade as they do in real life—only this hap-
pens, of course, in a ‘second life.’”  Id. at 1304. 
 93 EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS:  THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF ONLINE 
GAMES 9 (2005). 
 94 THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note 91, at 15. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See id. at 16. 
 97 See id. at 15. 
 98 See id. at 16. 
 99 Chuleenan Svetvilas, Real Law in the Virtual World, CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2008), 
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=NaN&eid=890855&evid=1. 
100 See THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note 91. 
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Along with all the benefits that virtual worlds provide, the use of 
virtual worlds can also cause problems.  The main concern regarding 
virtual worlds has been expressed by intelligence officials who have 
examined virtual world systems and are convinced that “the qualities 
that many computer users find so attractive about virtual worlds—
including anonymity, global access and the expanded ability to make 
financial transfers outside normal channels—have turned them into 
seedbeds for transnational threats.”101  “Unfortunately, what started 
out as a benign environment where people would congregate to 
share information or explore fantasy worlds is now offering the op-
portunity for religious/political extremists to recruit, rehearse, trans-
fer money, and ultimately engage in information warfare or worse 
with impunity.”102 
This concern that virtual worlds will be used as the next terrorist 
battlefield raises issues regarding the proper limits that need to be 
placed on the government’s quest to improve security through data 
collection and analysis and the surveillance of commercial computer 
systems.  The following evaluation of monitoring virtual worlds in re-
lation to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
the Wiretap Act, FISA, CALEA, and the use of National Security Let-
ters will hopefully shed some light on this growing area of concern. 
A.  Statutory Application 
1. Fourth Amendment Protection 
An important consideration is whether the Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable searches also applies to conduct in 
the virtual world.  One argument is that if virtual world technology is 
intentionally designed to make humans act as though the virtual 
world is in some respects real, then the law ought to respect privacy 
expectations as it does in real life.  If so, then if an avatar is out at a 
shopping mall or driving a car in the virtual world, this conduct 
would be considered public and no reasonable expectation of privacy 
would exist (in that virtual world).  Contrastingly, if an avatar was en-
gaging in activity within his virtual home, than this would be consi-
dered private conduct protected from unwanted intrusion. 
 
101 Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Spies’ Battleground Turns Virtual, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/02/05/AR200802050314
4.html?sub=AR. 
102 Id. 
1052 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
Under this line of thinking, just like in the real world, any search 
would be subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and 
would be considered unreasonable without a warrant.  However, the 
same exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as consent to be 
searched, exigent circumstances, and evidence located in plain view, 
would apply.  For example, if an individual entering the virtual world 
is notified that his virtual conduct is monitored and the individual 
agrees, then just like in real life, there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy and the avatar’s conduct can be monitored.  Arguably, the vir-
tual world is a recognized public community; therefore, whoever de-
velops an avatar voluntarily and knowingly agrees to live and play in 
this public community, thereby eliminating any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.  Furthermore, some virtual worlds, such as Second 
Life, include a privacy statement in its “Community Standards.”103  
This statement explains that Residents are entitled to a reasonable 
level of privacy with regard to their Second Lives.104  This means that 
sharing personal information about a fellow Resident—including 
gender, religion, age, marital status, race, sexual preference, and real-
world location beyond what is provided by the Resident in the First 
Life page of their Resident profile—is a violation of that Resident’s 
privacy.105  Also, remotely monitoring conversations, posting conversa-
tion logs, or sharing conversation logs without consent are all prohi-
bited in Second Life and on the Second Life Forums.106  However, if a 
person voluntarily shares this information, then there is no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.107 
Another exception that may apply to the virtual world could be an 
exigent circumstance.  An exigent circumstance is an emergency situ-
ation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or se-
rious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a 
suspect or destruction of evidence.  There is no standard test for de-
termining whether such circumstances exist, and in each case the ex-
traordinary situation must be measured by the facts known by offi-
cials.108  However, these circumstances would cause a reasonable 
 
103 Community Standards, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2012). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See Privacy Policy, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/privacy.php#privacy1 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (stating that personal information disclosed while using 
Second Life “is public information and [the user] should not expect privacy or confiden-
tiality of this information”). 
108 People v. Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Cal. 1976). 
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person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was 
necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, 
the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of a suspect, or some 
other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforce-
ment efforts.109  Exigency may be determined by a variety of factors, 
such as the degree of urgency involved, the amount of time needed 
to get a warrant, whether evidence is about to be removed or de-
stroyed, and/or ready destructibility of the evidence.110  Information 
in the virtual world can easily be deleted and/or encrypted to prevent 
or greatly hinder understanding of it.  Because of this, obtaining a 
warrant may not be possible before evidence is lost forever, so the 
government or an internal overseer of the virtual world should be al-
lowed to retrieve or monitor information about an avatar’s behavior 
and activities. 
Lastly, the plain view doctrine may apply in the virtual world as 
well.  The real world plain view doctrine requires that three factors 
must be satisfied: (1) the officer has to be lawfully present at the 
place where the evidence can be plainly viewed; (2) the officer has to 
have a lawful right of access to the object; (3) the incriminating cha-
racter of the object has to be “immediately apparent.”111  This test can 
also be applied to the virtual world.  An overseer, such as Linden Lab, 
an ISP, or the government is allowed to monitor conduct in the vir-
tual world if the conduct is illegal.  Both Linden Lab and an ISP are 
lawfully present through a contract, such as the Terms of Service, that 
a user of the virtual world agrees to upon signing up with the ser-
vice.112  The government is lawfully present due to the fact that the 
conduct is illegal.  Therefore, the first requirement of lawful presence 
would be satisfied.113  Obtaining a warrant could also satisfy the re-
quirement of being lawfully present.  Second, upon being lawfully 
present, if Linden Lab, an ISP, or the government sees terrorist plans 
or weapons that are left out in the open in the virtual world, like on a 
table or on the floor, then the second prong would be satisfied.  
Third, possessing terrorist plans and weapons, such as bombs, al-
though in the virtual world, is still incriminating because its illegality 
is immediately apparent.  Therefore, if these three elements are satis-
 
109 United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984). 
110 United States v. Reed, 935 F. 2d 641, 642 (4th Cir. 1991). 
111 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990). 
112 Terms of Service, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php?lang=en-US#tos8 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (stating that posting, displaying, or transmitting illegal content 
is not permitted and will be reported to the authorities). 
113 Horton, 496 U.S. at 136–37. 
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fied, then the plain view exception would apply, and there would be 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in this behavior.  Based on this 
analysis, if a virtual terrorist cell is raided or searched, then this evi-
dence could be seized. 
The third element of the plain view doctrine—the incriminating 
nature must be immediately apparent—may be the hardest to prove.  
This is because the illegality of conduct, such as possessing terrorist 
plans or weapons, which occurs in the virtual world, may not be as 
apparent as it would be in the real world.  Conduct in the virtual 
world could be considered mere thoughts, and it is hard to hold 
someone accountable for their thoughts. 
However, in the real world, an individual can be held accountable 
for illegal conduct even if the conduct was never achieved.  Accord-
ing to the Model Penal Code, a person is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime if an individual “purposely does or omits to do any-
thing that, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an 
act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct 
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.”114  With that 
said, possessing terrorist plans on its own may not be enough to con-
stitute a substantial step to commit a terrorist act in the real world.  
However, possessing terrorist plans as well as possessing weapons to 
carry out a terrorist act in the real world without actually carrying out 
the act could amount to a substantial step in furtherance of the un-
lawful conduct. This conduct could result in an individual being 
prosecuted for an attempt to commit a crime under the criminal 
law.115 
With this understanding of criminal attempt law, conduct that 
may be considered mere thoughts in the virtual world could be eva-
luated similarly to conduct in the real world that falls under criminal 
attempt law.  Drawing this similarity to criminal attempt law in the 
real world would allow for the illegality of conduct in the virtual 
world to be immediately apparent in some situations.  For example, 
just possessing terrorist plans or just possessing weapons on their own 
in the virtual world, as in the real world, is arguably not enough to 
prove that the illegality of this conduct is immediately apparent.  
However, it is possible that these actions taken in the aggregate, 
meaning possessing both weapons and a terrorist plan, could amount 
to conduct where the illegality is immediately apparent.  This is be-
 
114 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1980). 
115 This Article does not discuss whether conspiracy or attempt law is applicable in the virtual 
world. 
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cause a single thought in the virtual world could be seen as unimpor-
tant, but multiple thoughts about engaging in a common criminal ac-
tivity, such as engaging in a terrorist activity, could be seen as a sub-
stantial step making the illegality of this conduct immediately 
apparent.  Therefore, in order for the third element to be satisfied in 
the plain view doctrine, an avatar would need to possess both virtual 
terrorist plans and weapons, or a combination of other conduct relat-
ing to engaging in a terrorist activity, in the virtual world. 
Another argument is that the virtual world is not real, so there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything that occurs in it.  
This means that there is no Fourth Amendment protection.  Virtual 
worlds are fictitious worlds where users voluntarily enter for fun and 
games.  They are open spaces intended for its users to inhabit and in-
teract via avatars.  Anyone is welcomed in—all you need is a member-
ship.  Basically, the virtual world is a public sphere, like a community.  
Because of this, an individual may not find surveillance in a virtual 
world offensive.  Furthermore, courts have not found a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in “matters which occur in a public place or a 
place otherwise open to the public . . . .”116  Therefore, if a virtual 
world is considered a public space (and it is certainly open to the 
public because anyone can create and maintain an avatar), then 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in conduct that occurs 
in the virtual world. 
2.  Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act 
Another important consideration is whether the Wiretap Act ap-
plies to conduct that occurs in the virtual world.  As mentioned pre-
viously, the Wiretap Act:  (1) prohibits the unauthorized, nonconsen-
sual interception of “wire, oral, or electronic communications”117 by 
government agencies as well as private parties; (2) establishes proce-
dures for obtaining warrants to authorize wiretapping by government 
officials; and (3) regulates the disclosure and use of authorized inter-
cepted communications by investigative and law enforcement offic-
ers. 
Communication that takes place in the virtual world occurs over a 
wire or electronically; therefore, communication among avatars in 
the virtual world would be protected from government surveillance 
 
116 Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
117 Electronic communications were added by Title I of the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act in 1986.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. 
1, §§ 101(c)(2), 110(b), 100 Stat. 1851, 1859 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006)). 
1056 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
under the Wiretap Act unless there were an applicable exception.  As 
previously discussed, the Wiretap Act has three applicable exceptions, 
which can be used to monitor communications in a virtual world ab-
sent a warrant.  These exceptions are:  (1) exigent circumstances; (2) 
consent to be monitored; and (3) the provider exception. 
First, the exigent circumstances exception applies when a federal 
agent, who has been designated by someone like the Attorney Gener-
al, “reasonably determines that . . . an emergency situation exists that 
involves—(i) immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to 
any person [or] (ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the national 
security interest . . . that requires a wire, oral, or electronic communi-
cation to be intercepted before an order authorizing such intercep-
tion” can be obtained.118  Virtual world conduct that is most likely to 
fall under this exception would be preparatory actions leading up to 
a terrorist activity because this behavior would constitute “conspira-
torial activities threatening the national security interest.”119  This 
conduct may include the recruitment of terrorists or the communica-
tion among terrorists within the virtual world.  Therefore, obtaining a 
warrant to monitor communications occurring in the virtual world 
under these circumstances would not be required. 
Second, the consent exception to the Wiretap Act applies either 
when an individual, acting under color of law, is a party to the com-
munication or one of the parties consents to have the communica-
tion monitored.  This analysis is similar to the consent exception 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.120  If an individual who enters the virtual world is notified that 
his virtual conduct is monitored and that individual agrees, then just 
like in real life, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and the 
avatar’s conduct can be monitored. 
However, the owners of Second Life, Linden Lab, can disclose a 
user’s personal or other account-related information under limited 
circumstances.121  For example, Linden Lab can share information 
“[i]n order to report to law enforcement authorities, or assist in their 
investigation of, suspected illegal or wrongful activity, or to report any 
instance in which we believe a person may be in danger[.]”122  There-
fore, by creating an avatar and knowingly and voluntarily agreeing to 
a virtual world’s privacy statement and user agreement, a user has 
 
118 Id. § 2518(7). 
119 Id. 
120 See HARR & HESS, supra note 19, at 219. 
121 Privacy Policy, supra note 107. 
122 Id. 
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consented to abide by that virtual world’s rules, which may include 
mandatory reporting of illegal conduct or permitting law enforce-
ment to monitor users if illegal conduct occurs. 
Lastly, the provider exception allows a provider of a wire or elec-
tronic communication to intercept, disclose, or use any electronic 
communication if engaged in conduct that is necessarily incident to 
protecting the rights or property of that service provider.  First, a vir-
tual world needs to be a provider of a wire or electronic communica-
tion.  Virtual worlds, such as Second Life, permit users to post, dis-
play, or transmit content throughout the virtual world through a 
network infrastructure.123  Therefore, a virtual world that engages in 
this type of conduct would be a provider of wire or electronic com-
munication.  Second, a virtual world’s conduct must protect its own 
rights or property, and not the rights of a third party.124  Virtual 
worlds have an interest in protecting themselves from users who en-
gage in illegal conduct, such as terrorist activity, and destroy the 
tranquility of the virtual world.  If virtual worlds become a haven for 
illegal conduct, then law-abiding users may stop paying for accounts, 
and, as a result, the virtual worlds may have to shut down.  For these 
reasons, the provider exception could permit virtual worlds to inter-
cept, disclose, and use electronic communication without a warrant. 
3.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
An additional issue to consider is whether FISA applies to actions 
taken in the virtual world.  A FISA warrant is required when dealing 
with the electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence information.  
In order to obtain a court order authorizing surveillance, FISA’s 
probable cause standard has to be satisfied.  This requires first that a 
federal agent demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that 
the target of the surveillance is a foreign power, agent of a foreign 
power, or a non-United States individual who is engaged in terrorist 
conduct; and second, that the significant purpose of the surveillance 
is to obtain foreign intelligence information.  Therefore, for federal 
agents to obtain a FISA warrant to engage in electronic surveillance 
 
123 Terms of Service, supra note 112. 
124 See, e.g., Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 393 (1st Cir. 1979) (explaining that the provid-
er exception does not apply to a person who is not an agent of the telephone company 
for monitoring that “had nothing to do with telephone company equipment or rights”); 
United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642, 645–46 (7th Cir. 1976) (discussing how telephone 
companies that intercept communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) can share 
those communications with the federal government only to the degree necessary to pro-
tect the telephone company’s rights or property). 
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they would need to show that the virtual world user is a foreign pow-
er, agent of a foreign power, or a non-United States individual who is 
engaged in terrorist conduct.  This can be done by finding the sub-
scriber’s real world information, such as name, address, and tele-
phone number, through the records held by service providers located 
in the real world.  This information alone may not be enough to satis-
fy the first prong of the FISA probable cause standard because the in-
formation may not link to an actual person or a hacker could have 
hacked into an innocent user’s account.  However, once a user’s 
name is identified, then this information could be used by federal 
agents to cross-match it with lists of known terrorists in the real world 
to see if the name is one of a known terrorist. 
 On the other hand, it may be easier to satisfy the second prong 
because to find a significant purpose an agent does not have to dem-
onstrate that the commission of a crime is imminent, just that the 
significant purpose for obtaining a warrant is to gather foreign intel-
ligence information.  This foreign intelligence information can be 
found through online conversations among virtual world avatars, on-
line postings in the virtual world, or conduct engaged in by avatars in 
the virtual world.  Since no evidence of an actual crime needs to be 
proven, this makes satisfying the significant purpose test easier be-
cause the analysis of whether a virtual world crime can be prosecuted 
in real world courts is avoided. 
FISA has a variety of definitions as to what conduct constitutes 
electronic surveillance requiring a warrant.  The provisions that may 
be applicable here are 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1), (2), and (4); however, 
monitoring conduct in a virtual world falls outside the scope of these 
provisions.  In regards to § 1801(f)(1), agents can target a specific 
United States person within the United States, and if a reasonable 
expectation of privacy existed, then a warrant would be required to 
monitor communications.  However, it can be argued that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a virtual world because an indi-
vidual who enters the virtual world is notified that his virtual conduct 
can be monitored in limited circumstances and if that individual 
agrees to the terms of use, then just like in real life, there is no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, and the avatar’s conduct can be moni-
tored in these limited circumstances.  Second Life, in its Terms of 
Use, lists one such limited circumstance to be assistance in a law en-
forcement investigation.  Therefore, monitoring virtual world con-
duct may be outside the scope of FISA § 1801(f)(1), and a FISA order 
would not need to be obtained to monitor virtual world conduct if a 
user provides consent. 
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FISA § 1801(f)(2) pertains to obtaining the contents of wire 
communications without the consent of any party involved.  Virtual 
worlds that have Terms of Use and/or Privacy Statements require 
their users to voluntarily and knowingly consent to be monitored in 
limited circumstances.  Since users have to agree to the terms in or-
der to use the services of the virtual world, § 1801(f)(2) also does not 
apply to the surveillance of conduct in the virtual worlds. 
Moreover, § 1801(f)(4) also prohibits surveillance when there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  However, as previously discussed, 
as long as virtual worlds in their Terms of Use and/or Privacy Policy 
state that users’ conduct is subject to be monitored in limited cir-
cumstances, then users of a virtual world have no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in conduct that falls within those limited circums-
tances.  Therefore, monitoring conduct in virtual worlds falls outside 
the scope of § 1801(f)(4) as well. 
Even if monitoring conduct in the virtual world fell within the 
scope of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1), (2), or (4), there is an exception to 
obtaining a FISA order that would be applicable in this situation.  
This exception, as discussed earlier, gives the President the authority 
to engage in electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence 
information when there is no substantial likelihood that the surveil-
lance will obtain communications to which a United States person is a 
party; the surveillance must be directed at communications among or 
between foreign powers.  Therefore, as long as it can be proven that 
the avatars being monitored in the virtual world are agents of a for-
eign power, then the communications can be monitored without a 
warrant.  This information can possibly be obtained by gaining access 
to subscriber information from the virtual world host. 
Lastly, if monitoring conduct in the virtual world fell within the 
scope of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1), (2), or (4), yet the exception dis-
cussed above did not apply, then roving surveillance could be used.  
This is because due to the anonymity of the Internet and virtual 
worlds, it may be hard for federal agents to identify with precision the 
individual that they want to monitor.  Under FISA, roving surveil-
lance provides a federal agent with the flexibility to intercept com-
munications made to or by an intelligence target without specifying 
the particular computer to be monitored. 
4. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
It is also important to determine how CALEA applies to conduct 
in the virtual world.  Since CALEA has been extended to the Internet, 
service providers are expected to work with law enforcement and in-
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telligence agents to make monitoring Internet traffic easier.  As dis-
cussed earlier, a virtual world owner can be categorized as a service 
provider because it is a network infrastructure that provides connec-
tivity to the Internet that permits its users to communicate through 
chat, e-mails, and posts.125  Therefore, requiring virtual worlds to fol-
low CALEA mandates would actually make it easier to monitor con-
duct in the virtual world. 
5. National Security Letters 
Lastly, NSLs may be used to obtain information about conduct 
that occurs in the virtual world.  As mentioned above, NSLs have 
been used by investigators to reveal the identity of a person who has 
posted anonymous speech on a political website.  Therefore, NSLs 
can be used to unmask the identity of users in the virtual world.  Be-
cause a user in the virtual world acts anonymously through an avatar, 
if the avatar’s conduct relates to something political, such as terror-
ism, an NSL can be used as a way to obtain a user’s subscription in-
formation from the virtual world host.  The use of an NSL could be 
instead of, or to supplement, a subpoena because obtaining an NSL is 
much easier than obtaining a traditional subpoena. 
It is important to note that NSLs have been criticized by a variety 
of organizations, such as the ACLU, due to their increased usage and 
abuse by the FBI as a result of the PATRIOT Act.126  The ACLU has 
challenged this increased use of NSLs in three court cases—Doe v. 
Holder,127 Library Connection v. Gonzales,128 and Internet Archive v. Muka-
sey.129  These cases found that in part or in whole the issuance of an 
NSL was unconstitutional.130  Therefore, the further expansion of 
NSLs to the virtual world may be problematic. 
B.  Virtual Terrorist Conduct 
There has been some growing concern that virtual worlds are ac-
tually being used by terrorist organizations to launder money, recruit, 
 
125 See supra pp. 1056-57. 
126 See National Security Letters, ACLU (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/national-security-
technology-and-liberty/national-security-letters (describing the ACLU’s challenges to the 
PATRIOT Act and requests for information about the government’s use of NSLs). 
127 640 F. Supp. 2d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
128 Library Connection v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (Conn. 2005).  
129 Internet Archive v. Mukasey, No. 07-6346-CW (N.D. Cal. 2008); see National Security Letters, 
supra note 126. 
130 Id. 
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communicate, and engage in virtual world terrorism.  For example, 
Canadian Botnet Analysis Report describes a “dark universe” where 
“[v]irtual world terrorism facilitates real world terrorism:  recruit-
ment, training, communication, radicalization, propagation of toxic 
content, fund raising and money laundering, and influence opera-
tions” within online games.131  The few examples and general under-
standings of this “dark universe” are described below. 
1. Money Laundering 
There are concerns regarding the terrorists’ ability to take advan-
tage of challenges in policing the movement of virtual currency, such 
as Linden dollars, through the transferring of funds between opera-
tives around the world.132  United States intelligence officials have 
been cautioning owners of virtual worlds that their programs may be 
creating security vulnerabilities for terrorists and criminals to move 
money, organize, and conduct corporate espionage.133 
Although virtual owners in the United States have only been cau-
tioned about these concerns, other online companies have already 
been victims of money laundering schemes.  For example, recently 
“authorities in New York . . . charged more than 60 individuals—and 
arrested 20—in connection with international cyber heists perpe-
trated against dozens of companies in the United States . . . .”134  The 
cyber criminals used a program to hack into the company’s online 
banking webpages and steal passwords.135  This resulted in more than 
$800,000 being laundered and sent to the attackers in Eastern Eu-
rope.136  The investigation into this cyber crime and the takedown op-
eration included efforts from a variety of entities—the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the Southern District of New York, the FBI, the NYPD, the 
Department of State Diplomatic Security Service, the New York Office 
 
131 COMBATING ROBOT NETWORKS AND THEIR CONTROLLERS:  A STUDY FOR THE PUBLIC 
SECURITY AND TECHNICAL PROGRAM, BOTNET ANALYSIS, 112 (version 2.0 May 6, 2010), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/51938416/Botnet-Analysis-Report-Final-
Unclassified-v2-0. 
132 Chris Gourlay & Abul Taher, Virtual Jihad Hits Second Life Website, SUNDAY TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2007, at 4. 
133 O’Harrow, Jr., supra note 101. 
134 Brian Krebs, U.S. Charges 37 Alleged Money Mules, KREBS ON SECURITY (Sept. 30, 2010, 7:46 
PM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/09/u-s-charges-37-alleged-money-mules/#more-
5470. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
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of Homeland Security Investigation, and the U.S. Secret Service.137  
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara was quoted saying that these 
arrests show [that] the modern, high-tech bank heist does not require a 
gun, a mask, a note, or a getaway car.  It requires only the Internet and 
ingenuity . . . . And it can be accomplished in the blink of an eye, with 
just a click of the mouse.  [However, this] coordinated operation demon-
strates that these 21st Century bank robbers are not completely anonym-
ous; they are not invulnerable. Working with our colleagues here and 
abroad, we will continue to attack this threat, and bring cyber criminals 
to justice.138 
It is clear that the United States is taking these online money-
laundering schemes very seriously.  Hopefully, if virtual world owners 
become the next target, the techniques used to take down cyber crim-
inals in the above-mentioned plot could easily be employed and ef-
fective in virtual worlds. 
Even though owners of virtual worlds in the United States have 
not yet been impacted by money laundering schemes, a variety of 
countries abroad have been affected.  For example, the Seoul Metro-
politan Police Agency had to handle a money laundering situation in 
the virtual world.139  A group of Chinese and Korean criminals de-
frauded Korean gamers and laundered funds through a number of 
business front companies back to mainland China.140 
2. Recruitment or Communication via Virtual World 
There is suspicion that Islamic militants are using or have used 
Second Life to recruit individuals to engage in terrorist conduct.141  
The head of the Australian government’s High Tech Crime Centre, 
Kevin Zuccato, said that “jihadists may also be using the virtual reality 
world to master skills such as reconnaissance and surveillance.”142 
The virtual world is being used politically to gather support for 
different political campaigns.  For example, during the most recent 
elections in Spain, most politicians had established a virtual presence 
in Second Life.143  Some politicians had even established their own 
 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Marc Goodman, Crime and Policing in Virtual Worlds, FREEDOM FROM FEAR MAGAZINE, 
http://www.freedomfromfearmagazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=316:crime-and-policing-in-virtual-worlds&catid=50:issue-7&Itemid= (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
140 Id. 
141 Gourlay & Taher, supra note 132, at 4. 
142 Id. 
143 Goodman, supra note 139. 
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avatars, which in turn campaigned, held rallies, and put up election 
posters in virtual spaces.144  Additionally, during a recent political rally 
in the virtual world by a far-right French politician, his posters were 
defaced, he had “exploding [virtual] pigs” hurled at him, and Nazi 
swastikas were painted on campaign headquarters.145 
3.  Virtual World Terrorism 
World of Warcraft has a history of in-game terrorist activity.146  In 
the past, players would find a curse in a high-level dungeon that 
would turn them into living bombs.147  “They would then teleport to 
major cities and detonate themselves, killing nearby players.  These 
suicide bombers gradually began to target areas where a large num-
ber of players gathered, usually at auction houses or banks.”148  These 
attacks started to occur with so much frequency that some users be-
gan to avoid dangerous cities.149 
Moreover, a “[v]irtual bioterrorist Allen and his guild, domus 
fulminata,” used a comparable teleportation method to spread an ep-
idemic throughout in-game virtual cities.150  Allen and his guild used a 
contagious curse called “Corrupted Blood.”151  This curse had the 
ability to kill most players in seconds or to purposely infect other 
players.152  Allen’s conduct displayed telltale signs of terrorism be-
cause the group strategically blended in with the general population 
of the virtual world and preyed on weaknesses in the system in order 
to carry out an effective attack.153 
Furthermore, an anonymous intelligence official confirms that 
some computer users have used their avatars to destroy virtual build-
 
144 Id. 
145 Oliver Burkeman, Exploding Pigs and Volleys of Gunfire as Le Pen Opens HQ in Virtual World, 
GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jan/20/news.fra
nce (explaining that Marie Le Pen was the first European political party to open head-
quarters within Second Life, a virtual reality website, and her virtual campaign has incited 
a remarkable response from protesters). 
146 See David Thier, World of Warcraft Shines Light on Terror Tactics, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2008), 
http://www.wired.com/gaming/virtualworlds/news/2008/03/wow_terror (describing 
games that incorporate terrorist themes and actions that serve as “an invaluable tool not 
only for counterterrorists and epidemiologists but also sociologists and economists”). 
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ings,154 which can be seen in some contexts as an act of terrorism in 
the virtual world. 
C. How to Locate Terrorists in the Virtual World 
Is it possible to attribute a real world terrorist attack to an organi-
zation that developed in the virtual world?  If identification informa-
tion matches between the avatar and the individual, the virtual plans 
can be used as evidence to show intent, knowledge, and guilt.  How-
ever, attribution may be an issue, and this may be easier said than 
done.155 
Prosecution of individuals who have committed online offenses 
requires evidence that a crime was committed and of who committed 
the crime.  A way to prove the identity of an anonymous online of-
fender is to obtain the identity of subscribers, such as name, address, 
and telephone number, through the records held by service provid-
ers located in the real world.  Virtual worlds, such as Second Life, re-
quire that the information provided by a user to create an account be 
“accurate, current and complete information about [one]self as 
prompted by the registration form (‘Registration Data’) and [that the 
user] use the account management tools provided to 
keep . . . Registration Data accurate, current and complete.”156  This 
information can be obtained through subpoenas, for example to 
Linden Lab directly if dealing with a situation occurring in Second 
Life, to ISPs, or to PayPal.  This disclosure of information is permissi-
ble because individuals who enter the virtual world generally sign an 
agreement allowing the owners of the online world to provide the 
government with information about its users under certain circums-
tances, such as in the case of a lawful investigation.  For example, the 
government retains the power to ensure that networks of Linden Lab, 
which is the owner of Second Life, are “intercept-capable” and have 
data retention for a particular period.157 
 
154 O’Harrow, Jr., supra note 101. 
155 See generally Charles L. Glaser, Deterrence of Cyber Attacks and U.S. National Security 3 (George 
Washington Univ. Cyber Security Policy & Research Inst. Report GW-CSPRI-2011-5, June 
1, 2011), available at http://www.cspri.seas.gwu.edu/seminar2010_2011.html (describing 
the various reasons and challenges for erecting government-supported defenses and de-
terrences to cyber attacks). 
156 See Terms of Service, supra note 112 (describing the terms under which “Linden Research, 
Inc. and Linden Research United Kingdom, Ltd. (collectively ‘Linden Lab’) offer [users] 
access to Second Life”). 
157 See generally Sara M. Smyth, Back to the Future:  Crime and Punishment in Second Life, 36 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 18, 42 (2009) (referring to Second Life’s policy in 2009, 
but it is important to note that the government was given this authority). 
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Furthermore, the government can also require that the service 
agreement between Linden Lab and its users be drafted in such a way 
as to make it easier for the company to monitor and control illegal 
conduct by its users.158  This might include the reporting of illegal 
content, as is already required with respect to all ISPs in cases of on-
line child pornography.159  Illegal content may also include terrorist 
plans.  If this is true, then the owner of a virtual world that is being 
used as a breeding ground for virtual terrorist cells may also be re-
quired to report this conduct. 
Scientists have proposed another way to identify the user behind 
an avatar without obtaining a court order or intercepting online 
communication.  Researchers believe that the faces and behavior of 
avatars could help identify the user, and by “monitoring for signature 
gestures, movements and other distinguishing characteristics,” a be-
havioral analysis could help determine whether an avatar has been 
hacked and stolen or is under the control of its owner.160  This work is 
very preliminary, but the researchers involved are confident about 
the results because “[s]o far [they] have been very successful.”161  
Therefore, the attribution issue may be closer to being solved. 
With that said, finding ways to locate terrorist activity in the virtual 
world and then reporting it may be challenging.  However, “spy ava-
tars” or “undercover avatars” could be used.  In the real world, law 
enforcement agencies use agents to go undercover in online chat 
rooms to pretend to be underage children as a way to catch adults 
who are posing as children.  These agents go undercover in order to 
catch adults who are trying to set up meeting times with children to 
engage in sexual activity and child pornography.  Real world law en-
forcement agents also infiltrate drug rings and terrorist cells by hav-
ing agents pretend to work for the drug lords or terrorist groups.  In 
actuality, they are working undercover in order to monitor and ob-
tain evidence of illegal conduct.  Similarly, in the virtual world, an 
employee of Linden Lab, an ISP, or the government could make an 
avatar and go undercover befriending other avatars and possibly be-
coming part of a virtual terrorist cell in order to obtain evidence that 
 
158 Id. 
159 See 42 U.S.C. § 13031 (2006) (describing the requirement to “make a report of 
the suspected abuse to the agency designated . . . to take emergency action to protect the 
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tronic communication service or remote computing service to the public). 
160 Virtual People to Get ID Checks, BBC NEWS (July 28, 2011, 8:12 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
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terrorist activity is occurring in the virtual world.  Once the under-
cover avatar becomes part of a virtual terrorist cell, it would be easier 
to monitor the cell’s current and future conduct.  This solution may 
be costly; however, existing employees can be the ones who make spy 
avatars, so no extra money would be expended to hire additional per-
sonnel. 
D. Obtaining Evidence in the Virtual World 
As discussed earlier, to obtain a criminal warrant under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or under the 
Wiretap Act, a federal agent must prove that under the circumstances 
known to him or her there is a reasonable belief that a person has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.162  Also, as 
previously mentioned, the FISA probable cause standard to obtain a 
warrant is slightly different.  In actuality, the standard for obtaining a 
FISA wiretap warrant is lower than the standard for getting a criminal 
wiretap warrant.  Under FISA, there needs to be a finding of probable 
cause that the surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power, irrespective of whether the target is suspected of en-
gaging in criminal activity.163  There is also an additional element if 
the target is a United States person.164  The federal agent then also 
has to prove that the target knowingly engages in sabotage or interna-
tional terrorism or is preparing for such activities.165 
Should the virtual world be subjected to the probable cause stan-
dard of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and the Wiretap Act or FISA probable cause standard?  Do you need 
to have a reasonable belief that an avatar’s conduct in the virtual 
world is going to correlate to a crime being committed in the real 
world?  If a reasonable suspicion standard is followed instead of a rea-
sonable belief standard (due to the arguably reduced privacy in a vir-
tual world because it is a public space), then reasonable suspicion re-
quires specific and articulable facts taken together to form rational 
inferences from those facts.166  If a warrant is even necessary to obtain 
evidence from a virtual world, this standard would be easier to satisfy 
 
162 See United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating the test for prob-
able cause for a warrant). 
163 See supra Part II.C. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. 
166 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the po-
lice officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”). 
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because any evidence that an avatar is acting individually or meeting 
with other avatars to commit a terrorist act could be used to obtain a 
warrant.  Evidence like hosting group meetings in secret locations in 
the virtual world, speaking a secret language in the virtual world, col-
lecting virtual money, or carrying out terrorist activity within the vir-
tual world itself arguably could be used to form a rational inference 
that these avatars are organizing to commit or are committing terror-
ist activities in the real world. 
E. Prosecuting Virtual Crimes 
1. Elements of a Crime 
Criminal activity consists of four elements that must be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) prohibited conduct (actus reus); (2) 
culpable mental state (mens rea); (3) specified attendant circums-
tances; and (4) a forbidden result or harm.167  In order for an indi-
vidual to be prosecuted for a crime, these four elements must be sa-
tisfied. 
In order to be prosecuted for an activity in the virtual world, the 
virtual activity must consist of, or involve, conduct that would consti-
tute a crime in the real world.  If there are no real world conse-
quences, then the crime is a fantasy crime, which cannot be prose-
cuted.168 
Unless the criminal code is modified to accommodate virtual 
crimes, criminal activity in the virtual world has to satisfy the same 
four elements as criminal conduct in the real world.  First, the actus 
reus is present when the perpetrator commits an illegal act.  This 
conduct can occur wholly in the real world, wholly in the virtual 
world, or partially in both worlds.169  The illegality of the act is what is 
important, not where the act occurred.170  Second, the mens rea is 
present when the perpetrator knew that the illegal conduct was in 
fact illegal.  It is important to note that the mens rea of the perpetra-
 
167 See generally Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as “Virtual Crime”?, 4 CAL. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, ¶ 33 (2001), available at http://boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm [hereinafter 
Virtual Crime] (“[W]e define crimes as consisting [of] four elements:  prohibited conduct, 
culpable mental state, specified attendant circumstances and a forbidden result or harm.  
These elements are the method we use to impose liability for the commission of crimes.”  
(footnote omitted)). 
168 See generally, Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime:  The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 11 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 53–60 (2008) [hereinafter Fantasy Crime] (analyzing the pro-
priety of criminalizing fantasy crimes committed in the virtual world). 
169 See Virtual Crime, supra note 167, at ¶ 34. 
170 Id. 
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tor will be located in the real world.171  Third, attendant circums-
tances will be present when the perpetrator was not legally entitled to 
engage in the specific conduct at issue. 
The element of harm is the most challenging requirement to satis-
fy because in order for an individual to suffer harm, the virtual con-
duct must have some real world impact.  Real world harm could in-
clude financial consequences or emotional consequences.  For 
example, the transfers of money in the real world, the loss of money 
in the real world, or the destruction of the financial market in the 
real world are all real world financial consequences.  Virtual world 
conduct that results in real mental pain and suffering for an individ-
ual in the real world can also be considered a real world emotional 
consequence. 
There are three types of virtual crimes that have gained some at-
tention in recent years—virtual theft, virtual rape, and virtual harass-
ment.  We now discuss examples of each.  These examples range in 
the way they have been handled, and will later be used to suggest how 
to prosecute virtual money laundering, virtual recruitment and 
communication, and virtual terrorism. 
2.  Virtual Theft 
Gamers import and export real world money in and out of virtual 
worlds.172  This real world money can be used to acquire virtual prop-
erty,173 thereby giving virtual property value in the real world.  Virtual 
property can be traded in the real world,174 and virtual property can 
also be stolen.  Thus, the owner of a virtual perpetrator avatar could 
be subjected to real world criminal liability for the taking of one’s 
property in the virtual world. 
The United States has yet to prosecute a virtual theft; however, 
such an opportunity arose in 2008 when a user’s account in the 
MMORPG Final Fantasy XI was broken into, and items and currency 
valued at about $3800 were stolen.175  The theft occurred to a user liv-
 
171 Id. at ¶ 8 (stating that it is not possible to hypothesize difference between real world 
crimes and cybercrimes pertaining to the element of mental state). 
172 Fantasy Crime, supra note 168, at 65. 
173 Id. at 70 (“Since the virtual property was purchased with ‘real’ money, its loss inflicts a 
harm that resounds in the physical world.”). 
174 Id.  In conducting my own investigation, I have discovered that eBay sells Linden Dollars 
in exchange for United States currency. 
175 See Earnest Cavalli, Police Refuse to Aid in Virtual Theft Case, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2008, 1:25 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2008/02/police-refuse-t/ (“After the loss of almost 
$4,000 USD in virtual goods and currency, Final Fantasy XI player Geoff Luurs brought his 
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ing in Blaine, Minnesota, and the local police force found that the 
user’s goods were “devoid of monetary value” and reasoned that no 
theft had actually occurred.176  This outcome could have occurred for 
a variety of reasons.  First, it is arguable that the local police force was 
not familiar with the use of real world money to purchase virtual 
property.177  Thus, this virtual theft was not prosecuted, and the 
wrongdoer went unpunished.  Second, it is possible that the amount 
of money involved in this virtual theft was not enough to prosecute 
and expend resources on.  However, if a well-known company, such 
as IBM, lost money, then maybe some action by the local police force 
would have occurred.178  Either way, the United States is reluctant to 
consider thefts that occur in the virtual world as crimes. 
In contrast, the international community has taken steps to at-
tempt to prosecute and punish users who commit virtual theft.  For 
example, in 2009, a three-year prison sentence was issued to a known 
gang member for extorting virtual goods.179  According to Chinese of-
ficials, three suspects cornered the victim in a virtual cyber café and 
noticed he had a particularly large balance of virtual goods in his QQ-
Tencent account.180  A virtual assault ensued and the victim was 
forced to turn over the equivalent of nearly 100,000 RMB of the vir-
tual currency QQ coins.181  This case is interesting in that it may show 
that virtual goods must have value since an arrest and prosecution 
occurred, and thus could set a precedent in prosecuting virtual theft.  
In another example, in 2007, the Dutch police force arrested a tee-
nager for stealing nearly $6000 worth of virtual property in the Fin-
land-based MMO Habbo Hotel, but the outcome of this arrest is un-
clear.182  In another case in 2005, the Japanese police arrested a 
Chinese exchange student for stealing virtual property in the Asian 
 
case before the Blaine, Minnesota[,] police department only to be refused any kind of 
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MMORPG, Lineage II, and then reselling it on eBay.183  Lastly, the 
South Korean police force has developed a special unit that deals 
with in-game crimes, which is often inundated with virtual theft re-
ports.184 
3.  Virtual Rape 
In order for a perpetrator to be held criminally responsible for 
rape, there needs to be nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a vic-
tim, often through use of physical force.185  Some critics believe that a 
rapist in the virtual world may not be prosecuted in the real world 
because there is no real world harm since an actual person was not 
raped.186  However, others claim that the individual behind the avatar 
being raped can suffer severe trauma that can be similar to what one 
would experience from actually being raped.187  In this situation, the 
harm would be mental instead of physical.  However, rape requires a 
physical assault, placing this criminal conduct solely in the real world 
and not in the virtual world under our current law. 
Nevertheless, “virtual rape”, which can occur through text, anima-
tion, malicious scripts, or other means instead of by physical force, is 
a concern of some.  In the virtual world LamdaMOO, a text-based 
multi-user environment,188 a user, Mr. Bungle, used “voodoo dolls,” 
which are codes represented by objects, to gain control over another 
user’s avatar.189  Here, voodoo dolls were used by Mr. Bungle to make 
it appear that other users were participating in explicit, violent sexual 
acts in an extremely public part of the virtual world, known as the liv-
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ing room.190  “[T]he victims of Mr. Bungle’s [conduct] were shocked 
and traumatized by how he had manipulated their online characters 
and by how powerless they had been to stop him.”191  There was a lot 
of uproar regarding Mr. Bungle’s conduct in the virtual world, which 
resulted in a programmer of LamdaMOO terminating the actual us-
er’s existence in this virtual world.192  Another virtual rape allegation 
occurred in 2007, which resulted in the Belgium police wanting to 
patrol Second Life, but it is unclear whether they were given the au-
thority to do so.193  Neither of these incidents was handled by the real 
world legal system through the imposition of criminal liability for 
these activities that occurred in the virtual world. 
4. Virtual Harassment 
Virtual harassment has become a known problem in MMORPGs 
and virtual worlds.  However, this problem is usually dealt with by the 
entity that operates the MMORPG or virtual world, typically by sus-
pending offending players or banning them entirely.  For example, 
Second Life allows users to file abuse reports when there is a violation 
of Linden Lab’s Terms of Service or Community Standards.194  The 
abuse report is submitted to customer service, and it then takes ap-
propriate action, which ranges from an “official warning to a suspen-
sion or permanent termination of the abuser’s access to the Second 
Life world.”195 
5. Application to Virtual Terrorism Conduct 
These examples show that there are different classes of virtual 
crimes, and we have different abilities to prosecute them in the real 
world.  First, there are the virtual world crimes where the harm in the 
real world can be proven, for example, virtual theft.  These types of 
crimes appear to be the easiest to prosecute in the real world.  Like 
virtual theft, laundering money through the virtual world has real 
world consequences that can be ascertained.  The consequence of 
laundering money is that one party loses a certain amount of money 
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while another illegally gains that amount.  Therefore, prosecuting 
terrorists for using virtual worlds to launder money can be prosecut-
ed in the real world. 
Second, there are virtual world crimes that have real world conse-
quences but do not necessarily cause the harm that is required under 
the current United States Criminal Code to amount to a crime, for 
example virtual rape.196  Prosecuting virtual terrorist activity, such as 
communication, recruitment, or collecting virtual weapons, could fall 
under this category because it would be hard to prove that this con-
duct in the virtual world would result in harm in the real world.  
However, if it can be proven that the preparatory conduct actually led 
to a real world terrorist activity or that the virtual terrorist activity 
ended up being carried out in the real world, then there is the possi-
bility of prosecuting the user in the real world because the real world 
harm would be easily ascertained.  Therefore, if real world harm is 
proven, then this virtual world conduct could also fall under the first 
category. 
Finally, there is the category of virtual world crimes that only im-
pact users in the virtual world, for example virtual harassment.  Pu-
nishing terrorists who use the virtual world to communicate and re-
cruit new terrorists could fall within this category as long as the 
impact is only felt within the virtual world.  If this is so, then punish-
ing users may be better handled by the virtual world itself, by either 
having the host deactivate the users’ accounts temporarily or banish-
ing the users from the virtual world altogether. 
F. Who Should Police the Virtual World? 
There are at least three different options regarding who should 
police the virtual world—the virtual world itself, local police, and/or 
federal authorities.  The virtual world can police its users’ conduct 
through User Agreements, “community rules” and “privacy policies,” 
or by holding ISPs responsible for policing user content.  First, User 
Agreements have been used to terminate a user’s account if the user 
has committed an illegal act.  The User Agreement can also reference 
a real world statute through which the offending user can be prose-
cuted under in the real world.  This, for example, has been done in 
regards to copyright.197  Second, “community rules” and “privacy poli-
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cies” can specifically prohibit certain conduct and if a person engages 
in the prohibited conduct, the virtual world can punish the user.  The 
“community rules” and “privacy polices” can also include mandatory 
reporting provisions, which mean that other users have a duty to re-
port any illegal conduct that they observe or know about that is tak-
ing place in the virtual world.  Virtual world operators, such as World 
of Warcraft’s Blizzard Entertainment, try “to foresee vulnerabilities 
and address them as they become apparent.”198  Third, under § 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act, which is part of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, an ISP can be held responsible for policing us-
er content.  An ISP can restrict access to certain material or give oth-
ers the technical means to restrict access to that material.199 
While state laws and local laws could govern conduct in the virtual 
world for users located in a given region, each region may handle vir-
tual crimes differently, which could result in the unequal punishment 
among users from different states for the same conduct on the Inter-
net, which is inherently not bound by geopolitical boundaries. 
Federal authorities could also police the virtual world.  As pre-
viously mentioned, the federal government retains the power to en-
sure that networks are “intercept-capable” and have data retention 
for a particular period.  Additionally, the federal government can also 
require that the service agreement between Linden Lab and its users 
be drafted in such a way as to make it easier for the company to mon-
itor and control illegal conduct by its users in the virtual world.  For 
example, the definition of illegal conduct could be expanded to in-
clude virtual terrorism and virtual preparatory conduct. 
There has been some effort by federal authorities to start looking 
at ways to monitor virtual worlds, such as World of Warcraft.  The 
United States intelligence community has been trying to develop 
software that will detect violent extremists infiltrating these multi-
player games.200  This software is called the “The Reynard Project” and 
will profile online gaming behavior with the goal of “automatically 
detecting suspicious behavior and actions in the virtual world.”201  
Moreover, some government officials, such as Hillary Clinton, are en-
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couraging international cooperation to police the Internet,202 using 
“voluntary standards for prosecuting cybercriminals, protecting intel-
lectual property, securing networks, and pursuing terrorists who use 
cyberspace to plan attacks and woo followers.”203  So steps are being 
made to address this growing concern about virtual worlds being 
used to harbor terrorist organizations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Currently, there is no settled method on how to handle the priva-
cy rights of avatars in the virtual world.  However, using virtual worlds 
to carry out terrorist activities, recruit, communicate, and launder 
money is a growing concern that may require the United States and 
other countries to either use existing laws or create new legislation 
that permits the federal government or Internet Service Providers to 
monitor this type of conduct in the virtual world.  Currently, there is 
existing law that could apply to permit either the government or ISPs 
to monitor conduct in the virtual world.  For example, although the 
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy extends to 
conduct in the virtual world, it does not extend to conduct that is 
considered illegal or conduct that falls under a judicially created ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment.  Furthermore, the Wiretap Act 
would protect communication in the virtual world between avatars 
from government intrusion unless there was an applicable exception, 
such as the exigent circumstances, consent, or ISP exceptions, which 
would permit the interception of this communication.  Moreover, 
conduct and communication in the virtual world would fall outside 
the scope of FISA.  However, even if FISA did apply, there are excep-
tions that could apply, such as when no U.S. person is a party to the 
communication, which would permit the interception and surveil-
lance of the communication and conduct without a warrant.  Addi-
tionally, CALEA would apply as long as virtual worlds are considered 
a provider of wire or electronic communication.  Based on the analy-
sis in this Article, virtual worlds would be considered as such.204  Last-
ly, information exchanged and conduct engaged in could be moni-
tored or intercepted through NSLs, but as discussed in the Article, 
this is a contested area of the law that may not be applicable if ex-
panded to virtual worlds.  There is some existing federal law that 
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permits the surveillance of an avatar’s conduct in the virtual world 
under certain circumstances.  With that said, virtual worlds, specifical-
ly privacy rights in virtual worlds, are not addressed in any of these 
laws; therefore, a more effective method would be to enact a new law 
or amend an existing law to include the ability to monitor virtual 
worlds in order to protect against terrorist organizations using them 
as breeding grounds for terrorism in the real world. 
The issue of prosecuting offending avatars for conduct observed 
in the virtual world is challenging because attribution may be diffi-
cult.  Virtual crimes, such as theft, rape, and harassment, have been 
occurring and still occur in the virtual worlds.  Traditional criminal 
statutes that are relied upon to prosecute a criminal come up short 
for crimes in the virtual world because there is either no real world 
harm or the elements necessary to be prosecuted for a crime are not 
satisfied.  This results in virtual wrongdoers going unpunished.  This 
issue could be addressed by tailoring the current criminal statutes to 
include illegal conduct, such as recruiting, communicating, money 
laundering, and bombing, done in the virtual worlds by terrorist or-
ganizations.  The United States, as well as the rest of the world, needs 
to be prepared when these virtual terrorist acts start to be identified 
and prosecuted.  The ways in which virtual theft, rape, or harassment 
have been prosecuted can be used as models to help the United 
States, or the international community as a whole, combat virtual ter-
rorism that results in actual real-world terrorism. 
Since developing new laws takes time and effort, the easiest way to 
permit law enforcement to monitor an avatar’s conduct is by includ-
ing a provision in a privacy statement or terms of service explaining 
that an individual’s conduct in the virtual world is subject to govern-
ment surveillance and prosecution.  Virtual worlds, such as Second 
Life, have already taken to this, specifically in situations of child por-
nography.  However, these privacy statements or terms of service 
could be extended to include virtual terrorism. 
V. FUTURE WORK 
This paper has dealt with the ability to monitor conduct amount-
ing to terrorism in the virtual world through the Fourth Amendment, 
the Wiretap Act, FISA, CALEA, and NSLs.  However, there are a va-
riety of topics that have been left untouched but may have been ad-
dressed by earlier authors.  One such topic is whether international 
law and treaties should be applied to the virtual worlds and how for-
eign governments should handle or have handled illegal conduct that 
occurs in the virtual world.  This is an important topic.  Conflicting 
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laws may result in the wrongdoer engaging in forum shopping and 
being prosecuted in areas that have tougher laws but avoiding liability 
in areas with less strict laws.  Harmonizing how international laws and 
treaties are applied will assist in preventing this unwanted outcome.  
An additional topic that has been left untouched is the role of the 
free speech rights found in the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, which are implicated by proscribing conduct or speech.  
It can be argued that this speech is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment because it constitutes fighting words or imminent threats.  On 
the other hand, this speech could be regulated as a time, place, and 
manner restriction.  Another topic of importance is the issue of attri-
bution and making sure the actual wrongdoer is the one being prose-
cuted and punished.  Finally, as mentioned in the Article, another 
topic that has not been discussed is whether the real world crime of 
conspiracy is meaningful and applicable in the virtual world. 
 
 
